REMBE^® Safetyneering

A safety management system that covers all aspects and is applied at all organisational levels is the basis for protecting people, the environment and facilities from hazards emanating from corresponding processes and plants. In addition, by that the requirements set forth in regulations, directives, technical rules, etc. for the safe operation of plants are fulfilled.

Correctly performed and documented process hazard analyses meet the general requirements of regulations, guidelines, technical standards, and more. They serve the purpose of assessing risks related to plants and processes, ensuring they can be safely operated within acceptable risk tolerance limits, thus avoiding significant hazards to people and the environment.

(LOPAs: Layers of Protection Analyses.) Correctly performed and documented LOPAs, conducted as required, meet the general requirements prescribed in the applicable regulations, guidelines, technical standards, etc. They serve the purpose of semi-quantitative risk assessment for particularly hazardous scenarios and are based on the design of processes, plants, layers of protection, and their maintenance. Also including the „human factor“, they ensure that the plants and processes under consideration can be operated safely within acceptable risk tolerance limits.

While a safety management system is often positioned at a „systemic level“, plants with increased hazard potential often require an additional, more individualised and „process-related“ approach to adequately mitigate the hazards posed by such facilities. In addition, the requirements set out in laws, technical rules and other sources that reflect the state of the art for these plants, as well as the lessons learned from historical incidents and near misses that have occurred in these plants, can be implemented effectively and efficiently for the entire group, a group of companies or an individual site. The establishment of a separate company network is often the best solution here.

An adequately designed emergency relief system followed by a suitable containment system as protection against overpressure in process vessels is, beside the general requirements set forth in ordinances, directives, technical rules, etc., always absolutely necessary for the safe operation of pressure vessels in case a risk reduction has been assigned for the existence of those layers of protection to a potential scenario as part of a process hazard analysis. The same principle applies to the design of electronic safety interlocks and their trigger points. A re-evaluation of the design of layers of protection is always recommended when changes have been made to plants, recipes, or processes without verifying their impact on the functionality of these safety devices and, if applicable, their response time.